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Summary findings
Developed-country purchasers of exports from  Surprisingly, diffusion upstream combined with entry
developing-country industrial firms have often provided  downstream may increase the profits of both the OECD
considerable technical aid to the exporting firms. Some  importer  and its initial developing-country supplier
question the benefits to both OECD and developing  because the diffusion increases competition both
country firms of such transfers.  upstream and downstream. The intuition is that a firm
Pack and Saggi developed a model to analyze the  does not necessarily lose from competition in its market
implications of diffusion of the transferred technology to  so long as its buyer/supplier is also forced to behave
other developing country firms and the impact of the  more competitively as a result of diffusion. A limited
market entry of additional firms.  amount of increased competition at both stages moves
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Abstract
Industrial  country  purchasers  of exports  from industrial  firms in developing  countries
have often provided considerable  technical aid to firms in developing countries.
Questions arise as  to the benefits to  both the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation  and Development  (OECD)  firms and firms in developing  countries  of such
transfers. To address  these issues we develop a model that analyzes  the implications
of diffusion of the transferred  technology  to other firms in developing  countries and
the  impact of  the  entry of  additional marketing firms.  Surprisingly, diffusion
upstream combined with entry downstream  may increase the profits of both the
industrial country importer and its initial developing country supplier by moving
them to an approximation  of the vertical  integration  outcome.
The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the
author(s).  They  do not necessarily  represent  the views  of the World Bank, its Executive  Directors,  or
the countries  they  represent.  The paper should  not be cited without  the permission  of the author.
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The rapid growth  of a few Asian  countries  such as Korea and Taiwan,  China  was associated  with
an even more  rapid growth  in exports. This association  has raised the question  of whether  exports, in
addition to  providing a  source of  demand and  the  foreign exchange for  capital goods and
intermediates,  has also generated additional supply augmenting effects. Does the correlation of
exports and rapid gross domestic  product (GDP)  growth imply that exports  confer some productivity
augmenting  effect that is not generated  by sales in the domestic  market? It is now well documented
that during their initial growth spurts both manufacturers  in Korean and Taiwan, China benefited
from technology  transfer  by industrial  country  purchasers  of their products (Rhee,  Ross-Larson,  and
Pursell 1984).  If these transfers cost the developing-country  manufacturer  less than the benefits they
provide, they constitute  one potential channel through which exporting may confer an externality. 1
Unlike the externalities envisioned in  many endogenous growth models, it  is neither physical
investment  nor education  that generate  an externality  but the size of exports and the interaction  with
purchasers. This process could help to explain the result in many cross-country  regressions that
exports appear to be a correlate  of high growth rates of GDP per capita,  though such studies do not
establish  the causal  mechanism.  (Levine  and Renelt 1992).2
A related issue that can be addressed more fully by considering externalities is the recent
discussion  of the role of total factor  productivity  (TFP)  growth  in explaining  the high growth  rates of
Korea, Taiwan, China  and a few other countries.  In particular,  Kim and  Lau (1994) find virtually no
TFP growth in countries such as Korea and Taiwan, China. One explanation they offer is that
improvement  in physical  TFP (say yards of cloth per loom and unskilled worker) does not translate
into domestic gains in income as foreign suppliers of knowledge or machinery fully price their
products, extracting the entire economic  benefit for themselves,  leaving the recipient country with
only the normal return on labor and capital. The lack of inframarginal  benefits depends on the
absence  of technological  diffusion.  This paper suggests  a model in which significant  benefits may in
fact accrue to local firms who are the indirect  beneficiaries  of such transfers. Whether the Kim and
1 The  cost  of the  transfer  will  include  any  payment  obtained  by the  transferor  whether  as an explicit  charge
or via a reduced  price for the output  plus any additional  personnel  and other  costs  borne by the transferee.
2 A recent  paper  of Clerides,  Lachs,  and Tybout  (1998)  attempts  to measure  externalities  from  exporting.
Our  model  provides  some  of  the  theoretical  underpinning  explaining  why  such  externalities  may  occur.Lau results about the TFP growth  having  been zero are correct is an empirical issue. But their basis
for explaining  their result is dependent  on a specific  set of assumptions  about the behavior  of firms.
There are several  puzzling aspects  to the process  of technology  transfer  undertaken  by importers
in industrial countries.  Most importantly,  why do they provide such knowledge  given that it could
diffuse to other local firms (say via worker mobility) who may then sell to  other importers in
industrial countries. The types of knowledge  transmitted  include product designs, improvements  in
production technology including adjustments  in machinery  settings, and advice on packaging and
instruction materials. When these transfers occurred in the 1960s and 1970s,  property rights were
very weak in all of the Asian countries  and the types of knowledge  transferred  are in any regime of
intellectual  property  rights, difficult  to protect.  In such situations,  the firms in industrial countries  are
providing  a form of general training that is highly  transferable  to other firms (Becker 1964).  While it
is possible  that the recipients  of knowledge  transfers  implicitly  pay for it by receiving  lower prices for
their products, we  develop an  alternative view  of why technology suppliers may offer their
knowledge  without  extracting  payment  for the transferable  component.
We thus emphasize the analysis of technology transfers that are vertical, conforming to the
growing  amount of trade between OECD  wholesalers  and retailers  and manufacturers  in developing
countries.  This contrasts  with recent analyses  of the horizontal  aspects  of technology  transfers among
firms that produce the same products (Ethier and Markusen 1996, Saggi 1996, Kabiraj and Marjit
1993,  and Glass  and Saggi 1998).
Section  2 briefly discusses  the available  evidence  on technology  transfers  by OECD  importers of
products from developing  countries  and discusses  the structure  of these  transfers. Section  3 presents a
formal  model  of the process and section  4 offers conclusions.
2. Empirical Evidence and Overview
A substantial  body of empirical evidence  indicates  that considerable  vertical  knowledge  transfer
from developing  countries  to the Asian  newly industrialized  countries  (NICs)  has occurred  as OECD
firms have bought part or all of the output of local firms and have sold it under the name of the
purchaser  (Hobday 1995).  For example,  companies  such as Radio Shack and Texas Instruments  have
commissioned  firms in developing  countries to produce components  or entire products, which are
then sold under the retailer's name.  Rhee, Ross-Larson,  and Pursell (1984), summarizing  the results
of extensive  interviews  in Korea in the late 1970s  report  that
2The relations between Korean firms and the foreign buyers went far beyond the
negotiation and fulfillment of contracts.  Almost half of the firms said they had directly
benefited from the technical information  foreign  buyers provided: through visits to their
plants by engineers or other technical staff of the foreign  buyers, through visits by their
engineering staff  to  the  foreign buyers,  through the  provision  of  blueprints and
specifications, through  information on  production techniques and  on  the  technical
specifications  of competing products, and through feedback on the design, quality and
technical  performance  of their products  (p.61).
Not only manufacturing  knowledge was transferred but  exact sizes, colors, labels, packing
materials  and instructions  to users. A large survey  of many firms in Korea and Taiwan, China in the
late  1970s found that importers maintained very large staffs based in the countries who spend
considerable  time with their local manufacturers  (Keesing 1982).  Studies in other countries such as
Taiwan,  China have confirmed such findings of significant  technology  transfer by industrial-country
importers (Hou and Gee  1995). Once mastered, such knowledge is useful to  other potential
importers. 3
To understand  how externalities  may arise, we construct  a simple  model in which an industrial-
country  firm may choose to engage  in vertical technology  transfer  by outsourcing  basic production  to
developing-country  firm(s). A key feature of the model is that once the technology  is transferred  to
an developing-country  firm, some of the knowledge  that is provided by the industrial-country  firm
may seep out to a nonaffiliated  firm  within the developing  country. 4 How does the possibility  of such
leakage affect the incentives for vertical technology  transfer? Since firms in developing countries
often lack the ability to successfully  market  their products  in the industrial-county  market, technology
leakage in the  developing-country  market actually benefits the  industrial-country  firm since it
increases  competition  among  the developing-country  suppliers.
However, there is a possibility that the decrease in price due to technology diffusion in the
developing-country  market may induce entry into marketing  thereby increasing competition in the
3  We assume  that the original  recipients  of knowledge  are contractually  bound  to the providers  of
knowledge  and do  not violate  their  contract.  Even  if fmns  were  tempted  to violate  their  contract,  the  reputation
effects  would  likely  be severe.
4 This  possibility  has led  to a concern  in the  United  States  that  transfer  of technology  by American  firms
will  eventually  adversely  affect  U.S.  income.
3industrial-county market.5 Accordingly, we extend our basic model to allow for such a possibility.
Increased competition in the industrial-country market may erode profits  of the original industrial-
country firm, but this effect may not be necessarily strong enough to dissuade the industrial-country
firm from outsourcing its production. In fact, our analysis shows that diffusion of technology among
developing-country producers  accompanied  by  entry in the  downstream industrial-country  market
may  actually benefit  the two  original firms engaged  in technology  transfer. The  intuition for  this
surprising result is as follows. In the absence of diffusion upstream and entry downstream, the two
original firms are in a bilateral monopoly and they impose a pecuniary vertical externality upon each
other by charging a price above marginal cost (i.e., the double marginalization problem). Diffusion
upstream  brings the  developing-country price  closer to marginal cost  and  benefits  the  industrial-
county firm. Entry downstream brings the downstream price closer to marginal cost and benefits the
original developing-country  firm. As a result,  as long as the competition resulting  from diffusion
upstream and entry downstream is not too severe, both firms gain from diffusion that leads to entry in
the downstream market.6 Note that if the industrial-country firm and the developing-country supplier
are vertically integrated, diffusion harms the industrial-country firm since under vertical  integration,
the industrial-country  firm  can obtain the upstream good at marginal cost. The implication of this
result is that fully integrated  multinational firms may be more averse to technology  diffusion  than
firms that are involved in international arms length arrangements. The above result may  also shed
some light on policies that favor licensing and other arms length arrangements of technology transfer
relative to foreign direct investment.
5 Panasonic, to name one firm, is largely a marketing company that has had remarkable  success in
penetrating  the U.S. market  after Japanese  finrs mastered  technology  originally  developed  by American firms.
There are numerous  instances of developing-country  marketing  frms arising,  which purchase local products
and sell them in the industrial countries.  For example, by 1978, Korea had over 2,000 trading companies
(Keesing  1982).  Taiwan's experience  has been  similar.
6 Of course, in the absence of downstream  entry, diffusion  hurts the original developing-country  fiirm,
given that  is has accepted  an outsourcing  contract. However,  one must be careful  here. Suppose  diffusion  does
not lead to downstream  entry. Does it necessarily  hurt the original  developing-country  frm?  The answer is
that  given the industrial-country  firm's decision  to outsource  is not affect,  it does. But it is entirely  possible  that
in the absence  of the possibility  of diffusion,  the industrial-country  firm  is unwilling  to transfer  technology.
43. Model
Our basic model is a three-stage  game involving  one industrial-country  firm and two developing-
country firms. 7 In the first stage, the industrial-country  firm (labeled by 0) chooses to outsource
production  to a subset of the developing-country  firms. The profits that the industrial-country  firm
can earn by producing  in the industrial-country  market are  normalized  to zero. The industrial-country
firm is willing to take a chance on transferring  a technology  over which it could conceivably  lose
control as it perceives itself to have a complementary  asset (marketing  skills) in the absence  of which
sales in the industrial-country  home  market are not possible.  Successful  outsourcing  requires  transfer
of technology  to the developing-country  firm(s) and involves  a per firm fixed cost of I that may be
substantial  (Teece 1977).  Let 0 denote  the share of this fixed cost that is borne by industrial-country
firm. It results in the acquisition  of technology  by developing-country  firm(s) that allows them to
produce a good that can be sold in the industrial-country  market by industrial-country  firm. In the
next  stage of the game, each developing-country  firm decides whether or  not to  accept the
outsourcing  deal. In the final stage, the industrial-country  firm obtains the basic product from its
developing-country  partner(s) and then markets the product in the industrial-country  market. The
output of the developing-country  firm and the marketing  effort of the industrial-country  firm are
complements-one unit of output  requires  one unit of marketing.
Complicating  the decision  of both the industrial-country  firm and the developing-country  firms is
the possibility of technology diffusion:  once the technology is transferred  to a developing-country
firm,  it may leak out to the other firm.  Letp denote  the probability  that the technology  leaks out to the
other developing-country  firm. 8 All firms recognize  the possibility  ofinterfr-m technology  diffusion
and take this possibility  into account while making their decisions.  Technology  diffusion within the
developing-country  economy  is incomplete:  post diffusion,  the marginal  cost of production of afirm
which is not directly  involved  in outsourcing  equals c2 > cl . The idea behind this assumption  is that
without  the explicit involvement  of the industrial-country  firm, developing-country  firms can achieve
7 Since  we wish  to focus  on the transfer  of technology  and not on its generation,  we assume  that the
technology  is patented  by a single  industrial-country  firm.  We  allow  for  potential  competition  in the  industrial-
country  market  later.
8 This may occur  as a result of labor movement  or the informal  interchange  of knowledge  between
managers  and  workers.
5only a partial understanding  of the technology  as many of the elements  are not codified  but are part of
the informal knowledge of the industrial-country  firm that remains within the firm's  possession
(Nelson and Winter 1982). Upon technology adoption, the developing-country  firms compete in
prices and the higher cost firm is limit priced out of the market so that price in the upstream  market
drops  to c2 > cl .
Before  proceeding further, two different cases need to be considered.  In the benchmark model,
successful technology diffusion in the developing-country  market does not pose any threat of
potential  entry  in the industrial-country  market. In this case,  the second  developing-country  firm must
also hire the original industrial-country  firm as a marketing agent. The alternative case is where
heightened competition in the developing-country  market may induce the entry of an additional
marketing firm. 9 In this scenario, competition  prevails in both markets: developing-country  firms
compete in the product market whereas the industrial-country  firm and the second marketing firm
compete  at the marketing  stage.  We first consider  the benchmark  model.
3.1 Benchmark Model
In order to solve for a subgame  perfect Nash equilibrium,  we solve the game by backward
induction. In the final stage of the game, the industrial-country  firm markets the output of the
upstream  developing-country  producer(s).  At this stage,  the number of developing-country  suppliers
is given.  Recall that if there are multiple  developing-country  suppliers,  they compete  with each other
in prices.
Let the demand curve facing  the industrial-country  firm be given  byp(q). Let w denote the price
of the good supplied  by the developing-country  firm(s) and mo denote the industrial-country  firm's
marginal cost of marketing. Taking w as given, the industrial-country  firm decides on how much
output  to sell in the industrial-country  market. Therefore,  the industrial-country  firm is a monopolist
whose  marginal  cost of providing  the good to industrial-country  consumers  equalsw + mo.  Facing  the
9 This  additional  marketing  firm  could  even  be a developing-country  firm.  The  crucial  point  is that  only a
large enough increase  in demand  for marketing,  makes  it worthwhile  to pay the fixed  cost  needed to be able to
provide  this service.
6demand curve  p(q) in the industrial-country  market, the industrial-country  firm solves  the following
problem:
Max (p(q) - w - mo) q
Let the optimal  solution  to the above  problem  be denoted  by qm(w).lO
Consider the decision of those developing-country  firms that are approached  by the industrial-
country firm. First note that since price competition  prevails in the upstream developing-country
market, if both developing-country  firms accept  the outsourcing  contract,  upstream  equilibrium  price
will equal marginal cost cl. Since all firms foresee  the nature of the competition  at the next stage,
given that one developing-country  firm accepts the offer, the second developing-country  firm will
prefer to take its chances  regarding  costless  technology  diffusion  rather than incur any part of the cost
(1 - 0)1.  Thus, an outsourcing  deal that does not compensate  developing-country  firms for their share
of the costs of technology  transfer  is not accepted  by more than one firm.  The question  then becomes
whether it is ever in the interest of the industrial-country  firm to  outsource production to both
developing-country  firms by bearing the entire (per firm) fixed cost I.  In other words, if  side-
payments are possible among firms, by bearing the entire fixed cost  I itself, the industrial-country
firm can create an alternative  developing-country  supplier  with probability  one or it may choose to
take the chance that the technology  will leak out to the other developing-country  firm  with probability
p, where 0 < p < 1.1  1  To explore  the trade-off  between  outsourcing  a single  versus multiple  firms, we
first need some  notation.
Let the optimal  price charged  by an upstream  developing-country  monopolist  (denoted  by l)be
given  by wl. Clearly,  w, is obtained  by solving  the following  problem:
Max qm(w)(w-ci)
w
0Note  that  the  dependence  of  qm  on  m°  is suppressed  for  expositional  ease.
11  An alternative  but equivalent  interpretation  is that  technology  diffuses  over time  and  p is the discount
factor  which  applies  to profits  earned  post diffusion.  Also  note  that,  the key assumption  here  is that while  the
transfer  between  the industrial-country  firm and a second  developing-country  firm entails  the cost  I, the second
developing-country  firm may learn from the first  developing-country  firm at a lower cost once  that technology
has been successfully  absorbed  by that first developing-country  firm.  Demonstration  effects or movement  of
workers  between  the firms may contribute  to such  learning.
7where qm(w)  is the derived derpand  curve facing  firm 1. Maximized  profits for each firm  i (gross
of fixed costs)  where i = 0,1 equal
r, =-(w 1 -c1 )q  (w 1 )  (3.1)
y  (wl)  )- (p(q  (w1))  -mO )  '(wl)  (3.2)
Upon technology diffusion, the  two developing-country  firms become competitors in  the
upstream  developing-country  market and the price falls  to c2<wl. It is clear that the industrial-country
firm benefits from the entry of an alternative developing-country  supplier due to diffusion. The
industrial-country  firm can also create  a second  developing-country  supplier  rather than depend  upon
the vagaries of diffusion.  However,  to do so, it must bear additional  full costs of technology  transfer.
Thus, while making its outsourcing  decision, firm 0 faces the following decision problem: it can
outsource two developing-country  firms by paying the fixed cost 21 and face a marginal cost of
output  equal to cl or it can outsource  to only one of them,  pay a lower fixed cost of only  OI  but pay a
higher  marginal  cost (w 1 if technology  does  not leak out to the second developing-country  firm and c2
if it does).  Let the net profits of the industrial-country  firm under  the first strategy  be given  by
v0(2) =  r 0 (c,  -21
where  0 (cl) denote industrial-country  firm O's  profits when it buys the upstream  good at pricecl.
Under exclusive  outsourcing,  its net expected  profits  are given  by
VO  (1) = (1 -p))rO(W1 ) + P,r. (C 2) -1  = ) 0(Wl)  + P(rO(C2,)  - 70(Wl )) -
Therefore,  the industrial-country  firm chooses  to outsource  only firm 1  iff vo(l) > vo(2)  <* I >  *
where
I*_  o0(Ci)  )-go(WI)  )-  PPo  (C2)  -)-p(W01)
2 -9
8Hence, a high enough fixed cost of outsourcing  implies that only one of the developing-country
firms will be outsourced. 12 This completes  the conditions required for outsourcing  of a single
developing-country  firm to be an equilibrium.  Note that single developing-country  firms always
accept  an outsourcing  deal since it is assumed  they are unable  to sell in the industrial-country  market
without  technology  and marketing  skills of the industrial-country  firm.
The  first main  point  of this  paper  can be  seen from noting that  since no(c2) > rro(wi), vO(l)
increases in  p:  technology diffusion between developing-country  manufacturers benefits  the
industrial-country  purchaser. 13 The decision  to transfer  knowledge  by industrial-country  importers  is
fully consistent with profit maximization even when it is  understood that the benefits of the
knowledge  provided  are not fully appropriated  by the recipient in the developing  country.  We next
extend  the model to allow  for the possibility  of downstream  entry  to determine  whether  this insight  is
robust  to the possibility  of potential  downstream  competition.
3.2 Potential Entry Into Marketing
Suppose there  exists a potential entrant, firm  3, who can successfully market in the industrial-
country  market  provided the  price  in  the industrial-country  market  is  sufficiently high.  Firm  3's
marginal cost of marketing is given by M 3. Assume that  p(qm(wl+mo)) < wI+m3 so that firm 3 cannot
profitably enter the market so long as the upstream price equals w1 and the downstream price equals
p(qm(wl)).  Technology  diffusion  in  the  developing-country market  lowers  the price  of the  good
produced by developing-country firms from w 1 to c2. Consequently, firm 3 may now find it profitable
to provide marketing  services if firm  1 continues to charge the monopoly pricep(qm(c 2+mO)). The
12 Teece (1977) and others have shown that technology  transfer costs are quite large, as much as 25
percent of total project costs for a multinational  establishing  a wholly  owned subsidiary.  For a subcontractor
where  the technology  supplying  firm  has no control  over  the staff,  the initial  fixed cost  of transfer  is likely to be
considerably  greater.
13 There is an interesting  if imperfect  analogy  between  this and the Prebisch-Singer  argument  that  technical
diffusion  within developing countries leads to a deterioration  in their tenrs  of trade relative to developed
countries  because  of greater  competition  in the sectors  undergoing  such diffusion.
9industrial-country  firm 0 can deter entry by lowering the price to c2 + m3 thereby enjoying a markup
of M3  _ MO  <p(qm(c 2+mo))-  Mon. 14
We  now  address  the  consequences  of  technology  diffusion  on  the  original  participants  in
technology transfer: the industrial-country  firm 0 and developing-country firm  1. First consider the
fate of developing-country firm  1. The key parameters that determine whether  developing-country
firm 1 gains or loses from technology diffusion are c2 and M 3 . When c2 is close enough to wl and M 3
is close to mo, developing-country firm  1 experiences  a large increase  in sales and  suffers only  a
small reduction in price as a result of technology diffusion. As a result, its profits increase because of
technology diffusion. In effect, it is as if the ex post elasticity of demand faced by the firm in the
noncompetitive market is high.
This result may help explain in retrospect why some of the policies of the Japanese and Korean
governments may have succeeded though the rationale provided here may not have been understood
ex ante by policymakers. In Japan, dissemination of knowledge to all firms who could benefit from it,
without any additional fees, was a condition for the approval of foreign technology licensees (Ozawa
1974, Nagaoka 1989). In Japan and Korea, cost reducing incentives that reduced M 3 , were provided
for domestic firms that became international marketing or trading companies. The potential private
benefits of a low marginal cost of marketing to the first developing-country firm that is outsourced
may be thought of as an externality to be captured by precisely the type of interventions undertaken
by the Ministry  of International Trade and Investment (MITI) in Japan and the Economic Planning
Board in Korea (Jones and SaKong 1980, Nagaoka 1989, and Ozawa 1974).
As  was noted  above,  when  the  emergence  of  a  new  marketing  agent  is  infeasible,  firm  0
necessarily  benefits from technology diffusion. What happens when there  is a potential entrant into
marketing? Technology diffusion now creates a trade-off for the industrial-country firm 0. It creates
competition among  suppliers  while it invites entry into the downstream industrial-country  market.
14 Note that a fixed cost of entry at the marketing  stage is easily handled. Suppose  M denotes  the fixed
entry cost  for finm  3. In this context,  we need to merely  define  a limit  price  PL which makes entry  unprofitable
for firm 3. This price would exceed finm  3's marginal  cost whenever  M > 0 and is defined by n3(PL) = M,
where  713(pL) denotes  firm 3's profits  as a monopolist  if it successfully  undercuts  firm 0's price and captures  the
entire  downstream  market  by charging  a price  pL-e.
10The industrial-country  firm 0 may still benefit from technology  diffusion  if the demand  in the final
goods  market is sufficiently  elastic  and the degree  of competition  downstream  is weak. In the absence
of potential entry into marketing,  the interests of industrial-country  firm 0 and developing-country
firm 1 necessarily clash. Surprisingly,  downstream  entry can tie the interests of the two together-
they both could benefit from technology  diffusion.  As noted in the introduction,  the intuition for this
result is that diffusion upstream coupled with entry downstream  reduces the extent of the vertical
externality  between firm 0 and firm 1 by moving  prices  closer  to marginal  cost in both markets.  Note
that if the developing-country  firm I were a fully owned subsidiary  of industrial-country  firm 0, the
vertically integrated  firm purely loses from diffusion since downstream  entry reduces profits. This
suggests that multinational firms that operate wholly owned subsidiaries  in developing countries
would be more averse to technology  diffusion than those firms that have arms length arrangements
with developing-country  firmns. 15
Next, we explore  the properties  of the equilibrium  with the help of a linear demand  example.
3.3 Example 1
Suppose  the demand  curve  in the downstream  industrial-country  market is given  by
P=A-q
We  only  consider  the  case  with  potential  entry  since  in  the  other  case,  it  is  clear  that  the
industrial-country  firm 0 benefits from technology  diffusion whereas the developing-country  firm 1
does not. Derived  demand  for developing-country  firm l's  output  is given  by
qm (w)=  A-w-m 0
2
Given the above  demand  curve,  developing-country  firm 1 chooses  w to maximize
15 This  result  may  help  explain  why  many  developing  countries  have  preferred  licensing  and other  arms
length  means of technology  transfer  to direct investment:  technology  may be more likely to diffuse  in the host
country  under  licensing,  etc.A-2-mo
,  - (w -c1 )  2
which  yields
A  A-mO  +  C2  (3-3)
=  2
Using  the above  we have
2Zl =  (w,  - cj)q"(w,)  =  [A  - mO, +  Cl  ]2  34
8
and
)ro = (A - q(w)  )-  mO  -wl)qm  (w,  [A-mO-Cl  ]2  (35
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After diffusion in the developing country, and with potential entry in the industrial-country
market,  prices equal c2 and m3+c2, respectively.  This implies
g  --  m 3 (A-M3  -C 2 )  (3.6)
and
-(C2  - cl)(A  - 3-C)(3*7)
Therefore,  technology diffusion  increases  firm l's  expected  profits iff  ir < n  . Further insight
can be gained by imposing the nornalization cl = mo = 0. Using equations (3.6) and (3.7), the
preceding  inequality  simplifies  to
A2 < 8c2(A-  m3 - c2 )
The above inequality  is illustrated  as curve A in the (c2, M 3) space  in figure 1. Along Curve A,
;TI  = ,rd  so that developing-country  firm l's  profits are unaffected  by technology diffusion. Above
this curve, firm 1 loses from diffusion  whereas  below it, it gains.  Note that as the marginal  cost of the
potential  developing-country  entrant increases,  the competition  that results from technology  diffusion
does not affect industrial-country  firm 0's profits much. On the other hand, if even a small drop in
upstream  price is sufficient to induce entry in the downstream  market, developing-country  firm 1
12gains from technology diffusion. Thus, for industrial-country  firm O's fate to be unaffected by
technology  diffusion  it must be that m 3 increases  with c2, the reason  curve A is upward  sloping.
Similarly,  diffusion benefits industrial-country  firm 0 iff  iod > i  .. Using equations (3.5) and
(3.6) and imposing  the normalization  cl = m=0  , we can  rewrite the preceding  inequality  as
A2 < 16m3 (A - m3 - c2 ).
In figure 1, Curve B plots the locust of g  = ro.  Along this curve, industrial-country  firm O's
profits are unaffected  by technology  diffusion. Above this curve, diffusion  benefits firm 0 whereas
below the curve, it hurts firm 0. By logic similar to that used above, for industrial-country  firm O's
profits to be unaffected  by diffusion,  m 3 must increase  with  c2.
The two curves  partition  the space  into four regions.  In region C, both firms lose from technology
diffusion. In this region, both c2 and m 3 are small so that drop in the price of the upstream
(downstream)  good hurts developing-country  firm 1 (industrial-country  firm 0) more than the
reduction in the marginal cost in the downstream  (upstream)  market. In region D, industrial-country
firm 0 gains from diffusion  while developing-country  firm 1 loses:  c2 is low here and m3 is high so
that upstream  price drops substantially  whereas downstream  price is not affected  much. In region E,
both m3 and c2 are high and both firms gain from technology  diffusion:  small increase in competition
at both stages  helps reduce the vertical  externality.  Finally,  in region  F, industrial-country  firm 0 loses
from diffusion whereas firm 1 actually gains since a small reduction in upstream price results in a
large reduction  in downstream  price (since  m 3 is large  relative c2).
4. Discussion
In the basic model we assumed Bertrand  competition  in both upstream and downstream  market.
As a result, no actual entry takes place in equilibrium  since potential entrants  are limit priced out of
the market.  How do the results of the basic  model change  if actual  entry takes  place? We next assume
Cournot  competition  on both markets  to allow for actual  entry to take place in equilibrium.
134.1 Example  2
Since equilibrium  in the absence  of diffusion and entry has already been derived in Example 1,
we now restrict attention  to the case where entry  takes  place in both markets.  Let the output  marketed
by firmj be given  by qj wherej = 0,3. The demand  curve  in the downstream  market is given  by
p  =  A - qo - q3  -
Profit function  for downstream  industrial-country  firmj is given  by
<r5  =(A-  q  -qj  -mo  -P  )qj,
where -j denotes  the rival downstream  firm andpu denotes  the price in the upstream developing-
country  market. The first order condition  for firmj is easily derived
,  .=-2qj+A-q  -mO  -PU
Solving  the first order conditions  above yields the equilibrium  output levels of the downstream
industrial-country  firms as a function  of the price in the upstream  market:
=  A-2mj-PU+m 1j  (4.1)
3
Adding the above two equations, yields the demand curve facing the upstream developing-
country  firms:
pU  Am  MO  3Q
2  2  2'
where Q denotes the total quantity demanded by the downstream  firms when upstream price
equals pu.  The two upstream developing-country  firms choose q,  and q2 noncooperatively to
maximize  their respective  profits
i  = [A  o  32  3q  _ ciqi  (4.2)
where I = 1,2 and -i denotes  the rival upstream  firm. Standard  calculations  yield
14=_3q_  +A  _  m 3 mO  3q1_
aqi.  ~  2  2  2
Solving  the two first order conditions  yields  the equilibrium  outputs of the two firms
A-m 3 -mO-+2c  i-4ci
9
and the equilibrium  price in the upstream  developing-country  market
pU  2A-m 3 -m  +2c2 + cl
6
This equilibrium  upstream  price can be substituted  back into the appropriate  equations  to derive
equilibrium  profits of the two upstream  developing-country  firms
,  =  (2A-m 3 - mO  +2c_  -4c) 2
1  8
as well as the equilibrium quantities  of production of the two downstream  industrial-country
firms
4A +  7m-j -1 lmi - 2(c 2 + cl)
as  well as  their  profits, which in  equilibrium, are just  square of  the  above quantities:
OZt=  (qj)2
We are now in a position  to consider  the effect of technology  diffusion and entry into marketing
on the profits of the firms involved in the original outsourcing  deal. Figure 2 plots the change in
profits of firms 0 and 1 before and after technology  diffusion.  Just as in figure 1, the two curves in
figure 2 divide the parameter space into four regions, which are interpreted as before. Thus, the
nature of market competition  is not critical for our results.
5. Conclusion
Much empirical evidence indicates that  downstream industrial-country buyers transferred
technology to developing-country  firms, which helped them export to industrial-country  markets.  In
this paper, we provide a simple  model that captures  that process. Our results indicate  that "vertical"
15international  technology transfer may differ substantially  from the horizontal technology transfer
emphasized  in the literature. In our model, a downstream  industrial-country  firm actually benefits
from the diffusion of the knowledge it transfers to  a  developing-country  firm since diffusion
increases demand for its services.  This argument  survives,  with qualification,  for a model in which
additional upstream entry may invite downstream  entry, and which increases competition for the
original supplier  of technology.  More surprisingly,  the two firms involved in the original  technology
transfer  may benefit from diffusion  since it increases  competition  in both the upstream  as well as the
downstream  market. The intuition is that a firm does not necessarily lose from competition in its
market so long as its buyer/supplier is also forced to behave more competitively as a result of
diffusion. This result is  possible because of the original distortion that exists in  the vertical
relationship:  a limited amount  of increased  competition  at both stages moves the two firms closer  to a
vertically integrated  firm.  An immediate  implication  of this result is that industrial-country  firms that
are vertically integrated with their developing-country  suppliers cannot benefit from technology
diffusion.  Thus, if they can help slow down  diffusion  to other  developing-country  firms (say through
restricting  labor turnover),  they are more likely to do so than firms that deal atarms length with their
developing-country  suppliers.
Our analysis has some implications for the recent discussion of the role of TFP growth in
explaining the rapid growth of Korea and Taiwan, China. As noted earlier, some authors, for
example,  Kim and Lau (1994), argue that developed  country  importers  may obtain all the rents that
accrue from learning by offering lower prices to developing-country  manufacturers.  The preceding
analysis implies this is not necessary. The simplest model suggests that the costs to developing-
countries falls because of technology diffusion, supporting the Kim-Lau interpretation.  However,
when entry of an additional  marketing  firm is allowed,  the profits of the original developing-country
firm  may actually  increase.  Thus, the view that  the potential  rents from technology  diffusion  were all
appropriated  by industrial-country  firms, depends on the response of  local agents, particularly
whether  managers  and workers supply other producing  firms with relevant  knowledge and whether
domestic marketing firms arise, perhaps with government support. Case studies demonstrate that
many marketing firms did emerge in both Korea and Taiwan, China (Levy 1989). In the case
analyzed here of vertical transfers (that were quantitatively  important during the early period of
industrialization  in Korean and Taiwan, China) it is very likely that the developing-country  firms
indeed  benefited.  If zero total factor productivity  growth is not to be viewed as a statistical artifact,
behavioral  explanations  other than  monopsony  power by industrial-country  firms needs to be offered.
16References
Clerides, S. K., Saul Lachs, and James R. Tybout. 1998.  "Is Learning by Exporting Important?
Micro-Dynamic Evidence from Colombia, Mexico, and  Morocco." Quarterly Journal of
Economics 113:903-48.
Becker,  G. 1964.  Human Capital.  Chicago:  The University  of Chicago  Press.
Ethier, Wilfred J., and James R. Markusen. 1996. "Multinational  Firms, Technology  Diffusion and
Trade." Journal of International Economics 41:1-28.
Glass, Amy, and Kamal Saggi. 1998. "Foreign Direct Investrnent and  the Nature of R&D."
Forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Economics.
Hobday,  Michael. 1995.  "Innovation  in East Asia: The Challenge  to Japan."  London:  Edward  Elgar.
Hou, Chi-Ming,  and San Gee. 1995. "National Systems  Supporting  Technical  Advance  in Industry:
the Case of Taiwan." In Richard R. Nelson,  ed., National Innovation  Systems: A  Comparative
Analysis.  New York: Oxford  University  Press.
Jones,  L.  P.,  and  11 SaKong.  1980.  Government, Business,  and  Entrepreneurship  in  Economic
Development: The Korean Case. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Kabiraj, T., and Sugata Marjit. 1993.  "International  Technology  Transfer  under Potential  Threat of
Entry." Journal of Development Economics 42:75-88.
Keesing, Donald B. 1982. Exporting Manufactured Consumer Goods  from  Developing to Developed
Economies: Marketing  by Local Firms and Effects of Developing  Country Policies. Washington
D.C.: World  Bank.
Kim, Jong-II, and Lawrence J. Lau. 1994. "The Sources of Economic Growth in the East Asian
Newly Industrialized Countries." Journal of Japanese and International Economics 8:235-71.
Levine, R., and David Renelt. 1992. "Sensitivity  Analysis of Cross-Country  Growth Regressions."
American Economic Review 82:942-63.
Levy, Brian. 1989. "Export Traders, Market Development,  and Industrial Expansion." Williams
College Center for Development  Economics, Research Memorandum Series, No. RM -114
(March):  1-24.
Nagaoka, Sadao. 1989. "Overview of Japanese Industrial Technological  Development."  Industry
Series  Paper No. 6. World  Bank, Industry  and Energy  Department,  Washington  D.C.
Nelson,  Richard  R.,  and  Sidney  Winter.  1982. An  Evolutionary  Theory  of  Economic  Change.
Cambridge,  Mass: Belnap  Press of Harvard  University  Press.
Ozawa, Terutomo. 1974. Japan's  Technological Challenge to the West, 1950-1974: Motivation and
Accomplishment.  Cambridge,  Mass:  MIT Press.
Pack,  Howard, and  Kamal Saggi.  1997. "Inflows  of  Foreign Technology and  Indigenous
Technological Development." Review of Development Economics 1:  81-98.
Rhee,  Yung, Bruce  Ross-Larson,  and  Gary  Pursell.  1984. Korea's  Competitive Edge: Managing
Entry into World Market. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Saggi, Kamal. 1996. "Entry into a Foreign Market: Foreign Direct Investment versus Licensing."
Review of International Economics 4:99-104.
Teece, David J. 1976. The Multinational Corporation and Resource Cost of International Technology
Transfer.  Cambridge,  Mass.:  Ballinger  Publishing  Company.
17m 3
2--  Curve  A
1--  Region D  Region E
/  ~~~~~~~Curve  B
Region C  /  c2  Region  F





Figure 1: The effect  of technology  diffusion  under  Bertrand  competitionm3
3- -
Region C  /  Region  F
Fiur  2  T  3e  3.5  5o
Figure  2: The  effect  of technology diffusion  under Cournot  competition.Policy Research  Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2046 Restructuring  of Insider-Dominated  Simeon  Djankov  January  1999  R. Vo
Firms  33722
WPS2047 Ownership  Structure  and Enterprise  Simeon  Djankov  February  1999  R. Vo
Restructuring  in Six Newly  33722
Independent  States
WPS2048 Corruption  in Economic  Shang-Jin  Wei  February  1999  C. Bernardo
Development:  Beneficial  Grease,  31148
Minor  Annoyance,  or Major  Obstacle?
WPS2049 Household  Labor  Supply,  Kaushik  Basu  February  1999  M. Mason
Unemployment,  and Minimum  Wage  Garance  Genicot  30809
Legislation  Joseph  E. Stiglitz
WPS2050 Measuring  Aid Flows:  A New  Charles  C. Chang  February  1999  E. Khine
Approach  Eduardo  Fernindez-Arias  37471
Luis  Serv6n
WPS2051  How Stronger  Protection  of  Carsten  Fink  February  1999  L. Willems
Intellectual  Property  Rights  Affects  Carlos  A  Primo Braga  85153
International  Trade Flows
WPS2052  The Macro  Wage Curve  and Labor  Dorte  Vemer  February  1999  H. Vargas
Market  Flexibility  in Zimbabwe  37871
WPS2053 Managing  Foreign  Labor  in Singapore  Elizabeth  Ruppert  February  1999  A. Sperling
And Malaysia:  Are There  Lessons  for  37079
GCC  Countries?
WPS2054  Who Controls  East  Asian  Stijn  Claessens  February  1999  R. Vo
Corporations?  Simeon  Djankov  33722
Larry H. P. Lang
WPS2055 Social  Security  Reform,  Income  Carlos  Serrano  February  1999  M. de Loayza
Distribution,  Fiscal Policy,  and  38902
Capital Accumulation
WPS2056 Does  a Thin Foreign  Exchange  Hong  G. Min  February  1999  K. Labrie
Market  Lead  to Destabilizing  Judith  A. McDonald  31001
Capital-Market  Speculation  in the
Asian Crisis Countries?
WPS2057 Finance  and  the Sources  of Growth  Thorsten  Beck  February  1999  K Labrie
Ross  Levine  31001
Norman  Loayza
WPS2058 Do Depositors  Punish  Banks  for  Maria  Soledad  Martinez  February  1999  A. Yaptenco
'Bad'  Behavior?  Market  Discpline  Peria  38526
in Argentina,  Chile,  and  Mexico  Sergio  L. SchmuklerPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2059  Financial  Intermediation  and Growth: Ross  Levine  February  1999  K. Labrie
Causality  and Causes  Norman  Loayza  31001
Thorsten  Beck
WPS2060  The Macroeconomics  of Delayed  Daniel  Kaufmann  February  1999  D. Bouvet
Exchange-Rate  Unification:  Theory  Stephen  A. O'Connell  35818
And Evidence  from Tanzania
WPS2061  A Framework  for Regulating  Hennie  van Greuning  February  1999  A. Thornton
Microfinance  Institutions  Joselito  Gallardo  80409
Bikki Randhawa
WPS2062  Does  Financial  Reform  Increase  Oriana  Bandiera  February  1999  A. Yaptenco
or Reduce  Savings?  Gerard  Caprio,  Jr.  38526
Patrick  Honohan
Fabio  Schiantarelli
WPS2063  The Practice  of Access  Pricing:  Tommasso  M. Valletti  February  1999  G. Chenet-Smith
Telecommunications  in the United  36370
Kingdom
WPS2064  Regulating  Privatized  Rail  Transport  Javier  Campos  February  1999  G. Chenet-Smith
Pedro  Cantos  36370